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Mental Files and Identity 
 
François Recanati 
Institut Jean-Nicod 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A rational subject, S, may take different (and possibly conflicting) attitudes towards the 
judgment that a given individual is F — for example, she may reject it as false or accept it as 
true — depending on how that individual is presented. For one and the same individual x, say 
Cicero, S may accept the claim that x was a philosopher if that claim is made in a certain way 
(‗Cicero was a philosopher‘), while rejecting the claim that x was a philosopher if it is made 
in a different way (‗Tully was a philosopher‘). Both ‗Cicero was a philosopher‘ and ‗Tully 
was a philosopher‘ say of the individual to whom both ‗Cicero‘ and ‗Tully‘ refer that he was a 
philosopher, so they make the same claim (true iff the individual in question was a 
philosopher), but the subject‘s acceptance or rejection of the claim depends upon the mode of 
presentation of the referent the two names share. If the referent is presented as Cicero, the 
claim is accepted, but if he is presented as Tully, it is not. That, of course, is possible only if S 
does not realize that Cicero is Tully. I assume that S has both the names ‗Cicero‘ and ‗Tully‘ 
in her repertoire, and that both names, as she uses them, refer to one and the same individual. 
The problem is that S herself does not know that. For her, there are two distinct individuals, 
and two distinct claims are made (one with respect to each of them). 
 To account for that sort of situation, Frege posited modes of presentation, or ‗senses‘, 
in addition to the reference of linguistic expressions. And he appealed to this idea to account 
for the informativeness of identity statements such as ‗Cicero is Tully‘. At the level of 
reference, the statement is trivial, since an individual (the common referent of ‗Cicero‘ and 
‗Tully‘) is said to be identical to that very individual — hardly a contingent matter. At the 
level of sense, however, the statement is informative precisely because the senses associated 
with ‗Cicero‘ and ‗Tully‘ are distinct. Sense determines reference, but does so only 
contingently. Because of that element of contingency, it is not guaranteed that the referents 
determined by two distinct senses (e.g. the sense of ‗Cicero‘ and the sense of ‗Tully‘) will be 
the same, and indeed a subject like S, unaware of certain contingent facts, takes them not to 
be the same. If the senses of the names were themselves the same (as in ‗Cicero is Cicero‘), 
the statement would be trivial and recognized as such by whoever understands it. 
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 Now what are senses or modes of presentation ? Frege himself thought of them as 
essentially descriptive. The referent is presented as having certain properties or standing in 
certain relations to other entities. Since sense is supposed to determine reference, a unique 
object must have the relevant properties or stand in the relevant relations to other entities. So 
a sense can, in principle, be expressed by means of a definite description ‗the F‘. The unique 
object which satisfies the descriptive condition (‗F‘) is the referent. In cases such as ‗Cicero‘ 
and ‗Tully‘, the suggestion is that the subject, S, associates different descriptions with the two 
names. 
There are good and well-known reasons for rejecting Frege‘s descriptivist construal of 
senses, however. Senses are supposed to help us account for ‗Frege cases‘. In Frege cases 
(e.g. ‗Hesperus‘/‗Phosphorus‘, ‗Cicero‘/‗Tully‘, etc.), the cognitive significance of two terms 
differs even though their reference is the same. (As a result, a rational subject may be led to 
ascribe contradictory properties to what is in fact the same object.) The problem with Frege‘s 
descriptive take on senses is that, if accepted, it forces the theorist to posit reference-
determining descriptions in the head of the subject whenever a Frege case is possible. Now 
there are three types of case in which contemporary philosophers of language and mind have 
been reluctant to do so : 
 
1. Reference through acquaintance. When we perceive an object and have a thought 
about it, the object the thought is about is the object the perception is about ; and that, 
arguably, is not determined by properties the subject takes the referent to have 
(Pylyshyn 2007). In many cases, we are actually unable to properly describe the object 
that is given to us in experience : we don‘t know what it is, yet that does not prevent 
us from referring to it directly (without conceptual mediation) and e.g. wondering 
what it can be (Dretske 1988 : 73).
1
 In such cases, even though we are unable to 
conceptually articulate what our thought is about, Frege cases are still possible. I may 
be perceptually related (through distinct sense modalities, say) to what I take to be two 
objects, which happen to be one and the same object. 
Faced with such cases, the Fregean is likely to say that the reference-fixing 
description in the mind of the subject must be something like ‗what I am now seeing‘ 
or ‗what I am now touching‘. But this supposes, on the part of the subject, reflective 
                                                 
1
 As Campbell (2006 : 205) puts it, ‗Your visual system is managing to bind together 
information from a single thing, and you are consequently able to attend consciously to it, 
even though you have not managed to apply the right sortal concept to it‘. 
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abilities the exercise of which is not required to suffer from identity confusions of the 
type which Frege cases illustrate. The subject need not reflect on her perceptual 
relation to objects in order to have thoughts about the objects she perceives ; nor does 
she have to reflect on her perceptual relation to objects to be in a position to think of 
the object in different ways, corresponding to the various ways in which she perceives 
it. 
 
2. Reference through communicative chains. In cases such as the ‗Cicero‘/‘Tully‘ case, 
the subject is able to describe the referent, but the descriptions he or she can provide 
do not fill the Fregean bill. First, the descriptions the subject can provide are often 
indefinite (‗a famous Roman orator‘) rather than definite. That does not prevent the 
term(s) from referring. Second, when the subject is able to provide a definite 
description, the descriptive condition often fails to be satisfied by a unique object. 
Again, that does not prevent the term with which the description is associated from 
referring. Third, assuming the description the subject can provide is definite and 
uniquely satisfied, the satisfier need not be the referent of the term whose sense we are 
trying to characterize, as in Kripke‘s Gödel/Schmidt case. This type of consideration 
has led a number of theorists, in the late sixties and early seventies, to argue in favour 
of an ‗externalist‘ approach to reference determination. According to Geach, Kripke, 
Donnellan and others, what determines the reference of a name on a given use is not a 
description in the head of the users, but historical facts about that use and the 
communicative chain to which it belongs. 
At this point the Fregean can make the following response : the description in 
the mind of the users in that sort of case is something like ‗the person called Cicero’, a 
description which (if the historical-chain picture is correct) is satisfied by whoever 
stands at the other end of the communicative chain which eventuates in the current use 
of the name. As Peter Geach pointed out, however, the existence of a communicative 
chain is sufficient to enable a name-user to successfully refer. The communicative 
chain does not have to be represented, any more than the perceptual relation to the 
referent has to be represented in order for the subject to successfully refer to an object 
he is acquainted with. 
 
3. Reference through indexicals. Indexical modes of presentation are essentially 
perspectival and cannot be captured by means of objective, non-indexical descriptions. 
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As Castañeda and (following him) Perry forcefully pointed out, for any indexical  
and non-indexical description ‗the F‘, it is always possible for the subject to doubt, or 
to wonder, whether  is the F (Castañeda 1999, Perry 2000). 
Reichenbach has suggested that an indexical is equivalent to a token-reflexive 
description (Reichenbach 1947 : §50). Thus a given token of ‗I‘ presents its referent as 
the utterer of that token, a token of ‗now‘ presents the time it refers to as including (or 
overlapping with) the time at which this token is uttered, etc. Insightful though it is, 
this move cannot support a descriptivist approach to indexical modes of presentation. 
What is needed to support such an approach is an objective, non-indexical description 
that provides the sense of the indexical. But for the token-reflexive description to 
count as non-indexical, the token in terms of which the referent is described must itself 
be described in objective/non-indexical terms, rather than referred to by means of a 
demonstrative like ‗this token‘ (itself a variety of indexical). Now if the token is 
objectively described as, say, ‗the F-token‘, the token-reflexive description will no 
longer be suitable for capturing the sense of the indexical. It is certainly possible for 
me to doubt that I am uttering the F-token, or to doubt that the F-token is being uttered 
now (or here), and that is sufficient to establish that the token-reflexive description 
(‗the utterer of the F-token‘, ‗the time/place at which the F-token is uttered‘…) does 
not provide the sense of the corresponding indexical (‗I‘, ‗here‘ or ‗now‘). In any case, 
such token-reflexive descriptions can only be grasped by fairly sophisticated users of 
the language who, in addition to mastering the notion of ‗token‘, are able to reflect 
upon the relations between token-representations and objects in the context in which 
these representations occur. Indexical thinking indeed exploits these relations, but in 
no way presupposes the ability to reflect on them. 
 
To handle these three types of case, which are counterexamples to Frege‘s 
descriptivist approach, we should make room for non-descriptive senses or modes of 
presentation. But what are such modes of presentation? What is it to think of an object non-
descriptively ? The theory of mental files is meant to answer that question. A non-descriptive 
mode of presentation is said to be a mental file. In Frege cases, the subject has two mental 
files for the same object (without realizing that there is a single object). 
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2. Mental files 
 
2.1 Mental files and ER relations 
 
There are different types of mental file, as we shall see in due course (section 3), but they all 
have the following properties. Mental files serve as individual or singular concepts. Like 
singular terms in the language, they refer, or are supposed to refer. What they refer to is not 
determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have, but in externalist 
fashion, through relations (of the subject, or of the file itself construed as a mental particular) 
to various entities in the environment in which the file fulfills its function. The primary 
function of the file is to store information from these entities — information that is made 
available through the relations in question. The information (or misinformation) in the file 
therefore corresponds to the properties which the subject takes the referent to have, but these 
properties are not what determines the reference of the file. 
The characteristic feature of the relations on which mental files are based, and which 
determine their reference, is that they are epistemically rewarding (hence my name for them : 
ER relations). They enable the subject to gain information from the objects to which he stands 
in these relations. In all the cases mentioned above as objecting to Frege‘s descriptivist 
approach, ER relations are involved. Relations of perceptual acquaintance are ER relations : 
they are the sort of relation to objects which makes the perceptual flow of infomation 
possible. Thus, by holding an object in my hand, I can get information about its weight ; by 
looking at it I can get information about its visual appearance. Perceptual files are, to use 
Perry‘s analogy, ‗buffers‘ in which we store the information gained on the basis of these 
short-term relations. The relations of ‗mediated acquaintance‘ established through 
communicative chains are also ER relations, which enable the subject (through 
communication) to gain information from the object at the other end of the communicative 
chain. The corresponding files are more enduring than perceptual buffers because the ER 
relation established through a communicative chain lasts longer than a transient perceptual 
relation. 
The contextual relations to objects which indexical reference exploits are also ER 
relations, and they are typically short-lived, but not always. According to Perry (2002), the 
SELF file (which provides the sense of the indexical ‗I‘) is based upon a special relation which 
every individual (permanently) bears to himself or herself, namely identity. In virtue of being 
a certain individual, I am in a position to gain information concerning that individual in all 
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sorts of ways in which I can gain information about no one else, e.g. through proprioception 
and kinaesthesis. The mental file SELF serves as repository for information gained in this way. 
In contrast, the files associated with the other indexicals (‗here‘, ‗now‘…) are based on short-
lived ER relations to the place we are in, or to the current time, which relations enable the 
subject to know (by using his senses) what is going on at the place or time in question. They 
are similar to perceptual buffers, which is to be expected given the link between indexicality 
and perception. 
On the mental-file picture, what distinguishes descriptive from non-descriptive senses 
is the mechanism of reference determination. To use Kent Bach‘s useful terminology, 
reference determination is ‗satisfactional‘ in the descriptive case, and ‗relational‘ in the non-
descriptive or de re case : 
 
Since the object of a descriptive thought is determined SATISFACTIONALLY, the fact 
that the thought is of that object does not require any connection beteen thought and 
object. However, the object of a de re thought is determined RELATIONALLY. For 
something to be the object of a de re thought, it must stand in a certain kind of relation 
to that very thought. (Bach 1987 : 12 ; see also Bach 1986 : 188-9) 
 
There is a variety of descriptivism which accommodates the relational nature of de re 
thought but ‗internalizes‘ the relations by incorporating them into the content of the 
associated descriptions. On this view, the sense of a singular term always is that of a definite 
description, but in the allegedly ‗non-descriptive‘ cases the descriptive condition F is 
relational. Thus, as we have seen, the descriptivist can say that in the perceptual case the 
mode of presentation is something like ‗what I am seeing‘ or ‗what I am touching‘2 ; and 
similarly for the other cases that raise prima facie difficulties for the descriptivist. But, as we 
have also seen, this view supposes reflective abilities the exercise of which is not actually 
required for having the relevant thoughts. The mental-file picture avoids this intellectualist 
pitfall. Mental files are based on relations to objects. Their function is to store information 
gained in virtue of standing in that relation to objects, and to represent them in thought. By 
deploying the file (or its ‗address‘ or ‗label‘) in thought, the subject can think about the object 
in virtue of standing in the relevant relation to it. But to entertain the thought, the subject does 
not have to reflect upon the relation in which she stands to the object. 
                                                 
2
 Or, in token-reflexive form : ‗what is causing this visual/tactile experience‘. (See e.g. Searle 
1983 for a token-reflexive analysis of the content of perceptual experience.) 
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2.2 Linking files 
 
Identity statements are informative, Frege says, whenever the senses of the terms on each side 
of the identity sign are distinct. Thus ‗A = B‘ is informative, in virtue of the distinctness of 
the relevant senses, while ‗A = A‘ is not, since (presumably) the same sense is exercised 
twice. In mental-file talk, this translates as follows : an identity statement ‗A = B‘ is 
informative to the extent that the terms ‗A‘ and ‗B‘ are associated with distinct mental files. If 
the two terms are associated with the same file, the statement reduces to a (trivial) assertion of 
self-identity. 
To say that there are two distinct mental files is to say that information in one file is 
insulated from information in the other file. Files are a matter of information clustering. 
Clustering takes place when all the information derives from the same source, through the 
same ER relation, and when it takes place, it licences the integration and inferential 
exploitation of the information in question. The role of the file is precisely to treat all the 
information as if it concerned one and the same object, from which it derives.
3
 But integration 
and exploitation of information is blocked if the relevant information is distributed in distinct 
files, for then, there is no presumption that all the information derives from the same object. 
So, even if I know that Cicero is bald, and that Tully is well-read, I cannot conclude that some 
bald man is well-read, despite the fact that Cicero is Tully : the information ‗is bald‘ is in the 
Cicero file, while the information ‗is well-read‘ is in the Tully file. Informational integration 
and inferential exploitation of information only takes place within files, on this picture. 
There is, however, an operation on files whose role is precisely to overcome that 
architectural limitation, by licensing the integration/exploitation of information distributed in 
distinct files. That operation, following Perry, I call linking. When two files are linked, 
information can flow freely from one file to the other, so informational 
integration/exploitation becomes possible (despite the constraint that it can only occur within 
                                                 
3
 ‗Updating one‘s files involves being disposed to collect information as if there is some one 
individual that one‘s file F has always been about. One‘s screening and pruning dispositions 
are responsive to this purported fact‘ (Lawlor 2001 : 88). ‗One reason for not allowing an 
individual concept [= a file] to change its referent is that the referent fixes a condition for the 
coherence of information within an individual concept : if ‗is F‘ belongs in belief mode to a 
given individual concept, then ‗is not F‘ should not. The constraints on updating would not 
obtain if an individual concept might shift its referent‘ (Sainsbury 2005 : 232). For a detailed 
argument to the same effect, see Millikan 1997 : 504-506,  2000 : 141-144. 
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files). Thus if I learn that Cicero is Tully, this allows me to put together the pieces of 
information in the two files, and to infer that some bald man is well-read. 
From a cognitive point of view, linking is a quite fundamental operation. It is 
involved, for example, in the phenomenon of recognition (which involves linking a perceptual 
file and a file based on memory). It is that operation which I think accounts for the cognitive 
effect of accepting an identity statement. To accept the identity ‗A = B‘ is to link the two files 
corresponding to the terms on each side of the equals sign. It would be incoherent to accept 
the identity ‗Cicero = Tully‘, and not let the information in the respective files get together 
and breed. 
 
2.3 Linking vs merging 
 
Strawson was the first to claim that identity judgments should be understood in terms of their 
effects on the management of files in the mind of the thinker (Strawson 1974 : 51-56). Two 
‗segregated bundles or clusters of identifying knowledge‘, he says, are ‗brought together and 
tied up into one for a given audience of an identity statement‘ (p. 52). But the operation on 
files which, according to Strawson, results from accepting an identity statement is the ‗merge‘ 
operation through which the two files become one. (‗Merge‘ is Millikan‘s term, not 
Strawson‘s.) As several authors noticed, however, the ‗merge‘ model is not adequate to 
describe the cognitive effects of identity judgments. 
Two linked files may end up being merged, after some time (especially as new 
information accumulates), but there are all sorts of reasons also for not automatically merging 
two files that are linked (Lawlor 2001 : 62-65 and 92-93). For example, it would be very risky 
to merge two files on the basis of an identity judgment that one may accept with less than 
100% subjective probability (Millikan 1997 : 508). Linking is less risky, as it can easily be 
undone. So merge is an option for dealing with an identity, but it should not be automatic.
4
 
Second and most importantly, the ‗merge‘ model is incompatible with the mode of 
presentation idea we are trying to cash out (Millikan 2000 : 147-149). It is of the essence of 
modes of presentation that there can be a multiplicity of modes of presentation for the same 
object. On the picture I have presented, mental files qua nondescriptive modes of presentation 
correspond to various relations in which the subject stands to objects, and there is no doubt 
whatsoever that a subject can and typically does stand in several relations simultaneously to 
                                                 
4
 ‗If the identification [A = B] is tentative, the notions [= files] may retain their identity ; if 
not, they may merge and become one‘ (Perry 2002 : 196). 
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the objects in his or her environment. Nor is this situation contrary to some normative ideal, 
as if the coexistence of several files for a single object was a defect to be avoided whenever 
possible. Imagine that I see a certain man cutting his grass and recognize him as Noam 
Chomsky. (Or imagine I learn he is Noam Chomsky, through an identity statement which I 
accept.) My perceptual file and my Chomsky file get linked, but there is no reason why either 
should disappear. Perry describes the perceptual buffer as being ‗absorbed‘ into the more 
permanent file in such cases, but I think the buffer should only disappear when the ER 
relation on which it is based no longer holds. Taking seriously the idea that mental files are 
modes of presentation based upon contextual relations to objects demands that we accept the 
existence of a multiplicity of files for the same object even when the files are linked and the 
subject is aware that they stand for a single object. 
Strawson‘s idea that two linked files should be merged makes sense in the context of 
his own enquiry, however. He was concerned with a very specific type of file, associated with 
proper names (his topic in the relevant passage of Subject and Predicate in Logic and 
Grammar). I call that type of file an ‗encyclopedia entry‘ (Recanati 1993, 2010 ; see §3.3 
below). Encyclopedia entries do obey the norm that there should be exactly one per object of 
interest. In Reference and Reflexivity, Perry describes files as ‗little cards in the mind on 
which we jot down information about people, things and places. My picture is a card for each 
person, place, or thing‘ (Perry 2001b : 54 ; emphasis mine). This description fits 
encyclopedia entries well, though I think it is a mistake to apply it to files in general. I shall 
say more about encyclopedia entries, and the norm that governs them, in section 3. For my 
present purposes, the important point is that encyclopedia entries are only one particular type 
of file, and that the norm in question only applies to that type of file. It does not apply to files 
in general, hence there is no reason to accept that, in general, linking does or should give rise 
to a merging of files. 
 
2.4 Presumptions of identity within files 
 
Besides judgments of identity, the cognitive effect of which is to link two files, there are also 
presumptions of identity, whose status is quite different. While linking only operates on 
distinct files, presumptions of identity are operative within a single file. As I wrote above, to 
put various pieces of information in the same file means that they are supposed to derive from 
a single source (i.e. through some ER relation to a given object). Pieces of information in the 
same file can thus be inferentially integrated and exploited as if they concerned the same 
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object (whether or not they actually do). This Campbell describes as ‗trading on identity‘ 
(Campbell 1987, 1994, 2002 ; see also Millikan 1997, Fine 2007). 
It is tempting to regard presumptions of identity as nothing but implicit judgments of  
identity. On this view the difference between argument A and argument B below is that, in 
argument A, the judgment of identity is explicit, while it remains implicit in argument B 
(which is therefore enthymematic). The reason why it can remain implicit in B is that the 
identity is obvious and trivial, so it ‗goes without saying‘ and can be suppressed, in contrast to 
what happens in argument A. 
 
Argument A Argument B 
Cicero is bald Cicero is bald 
Tully is well-read Cicero is well-read 
Cicero = Tully [implicit premise : Cicero = Cicero] 
------------------------------------ --------------------------------------- 
Someone is bald and well-read Someone is bald and well-read 
 
The suppressed premise in argument B is meant to ensure that the two occurrences of ‗Cicero‘ 
in the explicit premises of the argument actually corefer (if they did not corefer, the argument 
would be invalid, indeed). As Campbell and many others have shown, however, this view of 
argument B as enthymematic and resting on a suppressed premise is indefensible. In general, 
the attempt to reduce presumptions of identity to implicit identity judgments launches an 
infinite regress : 
 
If this view were correct, we would also need to make sure that the uses of [‗Cicero‘] 
in the suppressed premise are linked with the uses of [‗Cicero‘] in the explicit 
premises, and we would need further suppressed premises to secure these connections. 
The problem recurs, and we are embarked on a regress. (Campbell 1994 : 75) 
 
This means that we cannot regard arguments like the one under consideration as 
enthymematic, needing but a further (object-language) sentence to be made 
completely valid ; there is no evading unthinking reliance on sameness of reference. 
(Sainsbury 2002 : 135) 
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According to the [suggestion]… what it is to think that the individual Cicero is a 
Roman and then to have the coordinated thought that he is an orator is to think the 
additional thought that the one individual is the same as the other. But if the new 
thought is to have the desired effect, then it must be supposed that the individuals in 
the new thought are represented as the same as the respective individuals in the 
original thoughts ; and so the account is circular. (Fine 2007 : 68) 
 
To insist that the subject must make an explicit identity judgment before she can rec- 
ognize that two thoughts are about the same thing would be to invite a vicious 
regress—for even the simplest inference from ‗P‘ to ‗P‘ would then require infinitely 
many explicit identity judgments to establish the co-reference of premise and con- 
clusion. The moral here is much the same as the one Lewis Carroll drew in the case of 
modus ponens: we must have some basic way of taking two thoughts to be co-
referential which does not require an explicit identity judgment. (Schroeter 2008 : 
115n) 
 
I conclude that we need both the identity presumptions (or, according to the now standard 
terminology, ‗coreference de jure‘) and identity judgments (‗coreference de facto‘).5 In the 
mental-file framework, they correspond respectively to the clustering of information into 
files, and the linking of (distinct) files. 
 
                                                 
5
 Fine (2007) distinguishes ‗thinking of something as the same‘ (de jure coreference, in the 
standard terminology, or, in Fine‘s own terminology, ‗strict coreference‘) and ‗thinking of 
something as being the same‘. ‗A good test of when an object is represented as the same is in 
terms of whether one might sensibly raise the question of whether it is the same. An object is  
represented as the same in a piece of discourse only if no one who  understands the discourse 
can sensibly raise the question of whether it is the same. Suppose that you say ―Cicero is an 
orator‖ and later  say ―Cicero was honest,‖ intending to make the very same use of the  name 
―Cicero.‖ Then anyone who raises the question of whether the  reference was the same would 
thereby betray his lack of understanding of what you meant‘ (Fine 2007 : 40). However, as we 
shall see in section 4, de jure coreference as characterized through this test is an overly broad 
notion which covers different types of case, including some cases in which distinct files are 
involved. 
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3. The hierarchy of files 
 
3.1 Proto-files and the Generality Constraint 
 
I have alluded to the existence of several types of file. So far, the files I have talked about 
(with the exception of ‗encyclopedia entries‘, on which more below) are very closely tied to 
specific ER relations on which they are based. The file exists only as long as the relation 
(hence the possibility of gaining information about the object by exploiting the relation) 
exists, and for that reason the life expectancy of many files is rather short : they are temporary 
files. So, as long as I am in the right type of perceptual contact with the grass-cutting man, I 
can think of him demonstratively (‗that man‘). When I am no longer in a position to perceive 
him or to focus my attention on him, I can no longer think of him under the demonstrative 
mode of presentation since the latter involves the activation of a mental file which depends 
upon the existence of the right type of perceptual relation. When the relation is broken, the 
temporary file based on it disappears. (The information in the file is not lost, of course, but 
transferred into other files, e.g. the Chomsky file to which the demonstrative buffer is linked.) 
At this point we need to introduce a distinction between two types of file based on ER 
relations. ‗Proto-files‘, as I am going to call them, can only host information gained in virtue 
of the ER relation to the referent. For example, the proto-file SELF* can only host information 
gained ‗from inside‘, in the first person way ; the demonstrative proto-file THAT MAN* can 
only host information gained by perceptually attending to the object. I call these files ‗proto-
files‘ (and mark them with an asterisk) rather than files simpliciter because I want files 
(properly speaking) to serve as individual concepts, i.e. thought constituents ; and I take 
proto-files to lack a distinguishing characteristic of concepts. 
Concepts, in general, satisfy or ought to satisfy what Evans calls the Generality 
Constraint. Evans says that a subject in possession of a predicative concept F should be able 
to entertain thoughts in which that concept is applied to any object of which the subject has an 
individual concept ; similarly, 
  
If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the 
conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of 
being G of which he has a conception. This is the condition that I call ‗The Generality 
Constraint‘. (Evans 1982 : 104) 
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In the mental-file framework, predication is cashed out as follows : the file is what stands for 
the object of  which something is predicated, and the predicate‘s location within the file 
means that it is taken to apply the object in question. Translated into mental-file talk, the 
Generality Constraint says that a file should be hospitable to any predicative concept in the 
subject‘s possession. Clearly, that is a contraint which proto-files do not satisfy. Take the 
proto-file SELF* : it can only host information gained from inside, through e.g. proprioception  
or introspection. Now there is much information about myself that I cannot gain in this way. 
My date of birth is something I learn through communication, in the same way in which I 
learn my parents‘s birthdates. In virtue of the Generality Constraint, it should be possible for 
that information to go into my SELF file, and that is the crucial difference between the SELF 
file and the (nonconceptual) proto-file SELF* from which it originates. 
 
3.2 Conceptual files 
 
In contrast to proto-files, which are based on some ER-relation and can only host information 
derived through that relation, a (conceptual) file based on a certain ER relation contains two 
sorts of information : information gained in the special way that goes with that relation (first-
person information, in the case of the SELF file), and information not gained in this way but 
concerning the same individual as information gained in that way. Information about my 
birthdate is a case in point : I gain that information in a third-person way, through 
communication (as I might come to know anybody‘s birthdate), but I take that piece of 
information to concern the same person about whom I also have direct first-person 
information, i.e. myself ; so that information, too, goes into the SELF file. I am therefore able 
to exercice my SELF concept in thinking ‗I was born in 1952‘. 
It is because of that dual aspect of the SELF concept qua satisfier of the Generality 
Constraint that there are two types of ‗I‘-thoughts : those that are, and those that are not, 
immune to error through misidentification. When some information is gained from inside, that 
is, in virtue of the ER relation on which the SELF file is based, that information can only be 
about the subject : the way the information is gained determines which object it concerns (or, 
equivalently, in which file it goes). As a result, as Evans puts it, ‗there just does not appear to 
be a gap between the subject‘s having information (or appearing to have information), in the 
appropriate way, that the property of being F is instantiated, and his having information (or 
appearing to have information) that he is F‘ (Evans 1982 : 221). But when some information 
about ourselves is gained from outside, it goes into the SELF file only in virtue of a judgment 
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of identity. The thought ‗I was born in 1952‘ can thus be seen as the product of two thoughts : 
the thought that a certain person x, namely the person I hear about in a given episode of 
communication, was born in 1952, and the thought that I am x. The thought that I was born in 
1952 thus turns out to be ‗identification-dependent‘, in Evans terminology. 
Despite the fact that they can host information not derived through the ER relation on 
which the file is based, the file is still based on that relation. What this means is that the file 
exists only as long as the relation exists (and with it the special way of gaining information 
about the referent through the relation). Files should therefore be seen as an expansion of 
proto-files, including the proto-files themselves as their nucleus.
6
 Linking is what necessitates 
the expansion of the original proto-files. Linking makes information flow between files, but 
that only makes sense if the files can accept ‗alien information‘ (information from other files, 
that is, information that is not derived through the ER relation on which the file is based). So 
linking and expansion of proto-files are best construed as two sides of the same coin. 
 
3.3 Encyclopedia entries 
 
The distinction between proto-files and conceptual files based on the Generality Constraint 
was drawn in Direct Reference (Recanati 1993, chapter 7). Another important distinction, also 
made in chapter 7 of Direct Reference, is between two types of conceptual files. The files I 
have talked about so far are what we might call ‗first-order‘ files. They are based on specific 
ER relations. But we must allow room for more abstract files, based on the relation to an 
object that holds when we have first-order files about it, that is, when we stand in various ER 
relations to it which enable us to gain information from it in various ways. In Recanati (2010) 
I characterize such files as follows :  
 
Not all files are based on specific contextual relations enabling us to gain information 
about the referent in particular ways. Some files (the indexical files) are based on 
specific contextual relations, such as one‘s relation of identity to oneself or the relation 
to what we hold in our hand, but others (the encyclopedic files) are based on a more 
                                                 
6
 Peacocke notes that when the subject falls prey to a perceptual illusion of which he is aware, 
the content of the illusion ought not to figure in the subject‘s conceptual file about himself, 
because, at the level of judgment, ‗the subject rejects the content of his more primitive, pre-
judgemental phenomenology‘ (Peacocke forthcoming). This might be taken to argue against 
the inclusion of the primitive proto-file within the conceptual file. I acknowledge the 
difficulty, but cannot discuss the issue here.  
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general-purpose tracking relation. Thus my file about Mont Blanc contains all the 
information I can get about the mountain, however it is gained. It is not tied to a 
particular way of gaining information, nor to a specific ER relation. An encyclopedic 
file may exploit a number of ER relations to the reference of the file, in an 
opportunistic manner, instead of being based on a single one. Any relation will do, 
provided it preserves the link to the object. In this case, what determines the reference 
of the file is the overarching tracking relation : the relation between the file and the 
object it has been created to track (however it is tracked). Not being based on a 
specific ER relation, an encyclopedia entry is not short-lived, as the other type of file 
typically is. It survives when our contextual relation to the reference changes. 
(Recanati 2010 : 157-158) 
 
This might suggest that encyclopedic files are not based on ER relations ; however, 
that is not what I want to say. Rather, I distinguish between specific ER relations and the 
higher-order ER relation on which encyclopedia entries are based, namely 
 
xy [(R) (Rx,y)] 
 
where ‗R‘ ranges over ER-relations. A subject (or a mental file in the subject‘s mind) x stands 
in that relation to an object y just in case there is/are some first-order ER relation(s) in which x 
stands to y. A file based on the higher-order relation hosts any information derived in virtue of 
that relation, that is, ultimately, any information derived in virtue of any of the first-order ER 
relations. Such files correspond to what Perry calls ‗detached‘ files.7  
 For encyclopedia entries, the Strawsonian constraint ‗one object, one file‘ holds : since 
the file abstracts from the specific ER relations, there is no point in entertaining distinct 
encyclopedia entries about the same object. All such files would be based on the same relation 
to the object (the higher-order relation) so their multiplicity could only reflect the mistake of 
thinking that there are two objects where there is one. 
                                                 
7
 ‗Think of the architecture of our beliefs as a three-story building. At the top level are 
detached files.... At the bottom level are perceptions and perceptual buffers. Buffers are new 
notions associated with the perceptions and used to temporarily store ideas we gain from the 
perceptions until we can identify the individual, or form a permanent detached notion for him, 
or forget about him. The middle level is full of informational wiring. Sockets dangle down 
from above, and plugs stick up from below‘ (Perry 2001a : 120-21). 
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 I speak of a ‗hierarchy‘ of files for two reasons. First, files at each of the three levels I 
have described presuppose files at the previous level. Proto-files are the most basic ; 
conceptual files are generated from them (through linking-cum-expansion). Among 
conceptual files, first-order files are more basic, since higher-order files — encyclopedia 
entries — presuppose them. Second, files can be ordered in terms of how closely tied they are 
to specific ER relations. Proto-files are very closely tied to specific ER relations since they 
can only host information derived on the basis of these relations. This constraint in relaxed in 
conceptual files. Still, conceptual files remain closely tied to ER relations in the sense that 
their existence (like that of proto-files) is conditional upon the existence of specific ER 
relations to the referent. This second constraint is relaxed in encyclopedia entries, since they 
do not depend upon specific ER relations for their very existence, but only on there being 
some ER relation or other to the referent. Still, all types of file, including encyclopedia 
entries, are based upon ER relations to the object they are about, and their reference depends 
upon the ER relations on which they are based. 
 
4. Objections and Responses 
 
4.1 The circularity objection 
 
Two of my PhD students, Michael Murez and Gregory Bochner, have argued that the mental-
file account of de jure coreference is circular.
8
 Let me start by quoting a passage from 
Bochner‘s paper : 
 
Many advocates of  mental files, while presenting their view, themselves 
acknowledge—as if this were compatible with what they claim—that a mental file is 
created when an object is taken to be one by the subject.
9
 (…) But to claim that a file 
                                                 
8
 Murez 2009 ; Bochner 2010. The circularity worry is already expressed in this passage from 
Lawlor‘s dissertation : ‗In the context of building from the ground up an account of what 
constitutes coreferential thinking… [the theorist] owe[s] an account of what makes 
information belong to a single file. And [she] cannot provide this account in terms of a 
thinker‘s capacity for coreferential thinking. That would be viciously circular‘ (Lawlor 2001 : 
80). 
9
 At this point Bochner quotes Forbes, who writes : ‗When we receive what we take to be de 
re information which we have an interest in retaining, our operating system may create a 
locus, or dossier, where such information is held; and any further information which we take 
to be about the same object can be filed along with the information about it we already 
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is created for what is (perhaps mistakenly) taken to be an object is just to acknowledge 
that co-reference de jure rests on something akin to a prior judgement, [and this… 
suggests that de facto co-reference is primitive]. If you already need to think of the 
object in order to determine that it is a single object deserving a single location in your 
syntax, then this means that you must be able think of the object prior to the 
attribution of a vehicle or mental file. And, presumably, if some identity mistake is 
made in this early process of syntactic assignment—if, for instance, two different 
vehicles are created for a unique object taken to be two distinct objects—it will be that 
early mistake that will explain cognitive significance, not the fact that there are two 
vehicles. (…) All of this is incompatible with the idea… that it is differences in syntax 
that determine differences in cognitive significance, and, instead, squarely supports the 
opposite view that it is differences in cognitive significance that determine differences 
in syntax. 
 
As I understand it, the objection targets both the mental-file account of de jure coreference, 
and the mental-file account of identity judgements. According to the mental-file account as I 
have presented it, there is de jure coreference when two pieces of information occur in the 
same file and are ‗presumed‘ to be about the same object; while identity judgements have the 
effect of linking two distinct files, thereby establishing de facto coreference between the 
pieces of information in the respective files (e.g. ‗is bald‘ and ‗is well-read‘ in our earlier 
example). But if de jure coreference is a matter of belonging to a single file, and if, in turn, 
belonging to a single file is a matter of ‗being taken to be about the same object‘, then (i) de 
jure coreference rests on judgments of identity and therefore reduces to de facto coreference, 
and (ii) the account of de facto coreference (judgments of identity) in terms of operation on 
files leads us into a regress, since the files themselves, presuppose identity judgments : what 
goes into the file is whatever information we gain concerning the same object as inforrmation 
already in the file. 
In response, let me start by noting that the central idea that various pieces of 
information cluster into a single file when they are ‗taken to concern the same object‘ can be 
understood in a way that does not presuppose a prior identity judgment. It may be entirely a 
                                                                                                                                                        
possess. […] The role of a name is to identify a file for a particular object—as I shall put it, 
we use names to ―label‖ dossiers. In sum, then, on coming across a new name, one which is 
taken to stand for some particular individual, the system creates a dossier labeled with that 
name and puts those classified conditions into it which are associated with the name.‘ (Forbes, 
1990: 538; Bochner‘s emphasis.) 
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matter of sub-personal binding of information. Thus in the case of proto-files at least it is the 
cognitive system, not the subject, that takes the pieces of information to concern the same 
object and cluster them within a file. The subject does not judge that the pieces of information 
concern the same object. Identity is presupposed, it is built into the way the information is 
(subpersonally) packaged. So this is very different from an identity judgment, and coreference 
de jure does not reduce to coreference de facto. 
 As Murez makes clear, however, the difficulty comes from the introduction of 
conceptual files (the sort of files which are thought constituents and which are exercised when 
we make judgments). Something goes into a (conceptual) file if it is judged to concern the 
same individual as information in the file. The circularity objection therefore holds against 
what Murez calls the ‗sophisticated theory‘ of mental files, i.e. the theory that goes beyond 
proto-files and makes room for conceptual files (which Murez refers to as ‗relation-
independent files‘). Judgments of identity are accounted for in terms of a certain operation on 
such files (linking), yet the files in question, because they are conceptual, constitutively 
depend upon certain identity judgments : what goes into the file is whatever information we 
gain concerning (what we take to be) the same object as inforrmation already in the file. But 
if conceptual files themselves depend upon identity judgments (in order to be fed the ‗alien 
information‘ they need to qualify as conceptual files), then we cannot analyse identity 
judgments in general in terms of a linking operation on files, as I have done, without 
launching a regress. 
 
4.2 Proto-linking 
 
To avoid the regress, we must take advantage of the hierarchy of files and the distinction of 
levels it is based on. Proto-files, as Murez acknowledges, are characterized in terms of the ER 
relation which determines which information is allowed into the file‘s content, independently 
of any identity judgment. So what we must do is introduce a clear distinction between linking 
as it operates on these files (the proto-files), thereby making it possible for them to achieve 
the status of conceptual files, and linking as it operates on the conceptual files that result from 
the prior linking operation. The prior operation we can refer to as ‗proto-linking‘ (it 
corresponds to what, earlier, I called ‗linking-cum-expansion‘). This distinction provides a 
way to avoid the regress. Identity judgments are accounted for in terms of an operation on 
(conceptual) files, namely linking. The very notion of a conceptual file itself  presupposes 
some linking operation, but there is no circularity because the linking operation which the 
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notion of a conceptual file presupposes — proto-linking — is not quite the linking operation 
which accounts for identity judgments. It operates on proto-files, while linking operates on 
conceptual files ; and it expands the proto-file beyond (what becomes) the nucleus, while 
linking does not affect the structure of the conceptual files it operates on. 
Of course, there is a sense in which it is the same operation of linking in both cases, 
namely the operation that connects two files and makes it possible for information to flow 
freely between them ; but in one case it operates on proto-files, forcing alien information into 
them and expanding them accordingly, while in the other case it operates on already 
constituted conceptual files with a dual structure (nucleus + periphery) which it exploits but 
does not affect or modify. That difference between the two cases is sufficient to meet the 
objection. The files on which proto-linking operates are proto-files, whose proper functioning 
does not rest on identity judgments ; hence no circularity is involved in analysing identity 
judgments as establishing a link between two conceptual files, which themselves are analysed 
as resulting from a (proto-)linking operation on proto-files.
10
 
 
4.3 The transitivity objection 
 
In a couple of recent papers (Pinillos 2009, forthcoming), Angel Pinillos argues that ‗third 
object‘ accounts of de jure coreference (of which the mental-file account is an instance) are 
bound to fail. According to such accounts, Pinillos says, two terms are coreferential de jure if 
and only if they are associated with a single entity (e.g. a single mental file) which constitutes 
or determines their shared cognitive significance. (That entity is the ‗third object‘.) Pinillos‘s 
alleged knock-down objection to such accounts is that being coreferential de jure is not a 
                                                 
10
 Earlier, I mentioned recognition as a rather fundamental cognitive phenomenon involving 
linking. Presumably, recognition exists in non-conceptual creatures, and if it does, it is an 
instance of proto-linking. This suggests that proto-linking by itself is not sufficient to turn 
proto-files into conceptual files ; for if it were, it would be incoherent to assume that non-
conceptual creatures can have recognitional capacities (since proto-linking would 
automatically endow them with concepts). There are, indeed, several reasons for decoupling 
proto-linking from conceptualisation. First, the limited intake of alien information that comes 
with proto-linking is likely to be only a first step towards satisfying the full-blooded 
Generality Constraint. Second, more constraints than the Generality Constraint presumably 
have to be satisfied for conceptual thought to emerge. Instead of assuming that proto-linking 
automatically converts proto-files into conceptual files, therefore, we should enrich the 
hierarchy of files with an extra level : between the proto-files and the conceptual files, we 
should posit an intermediate category, namely the expanded proto-files which result from 
proto-linking. Such files remain non-conceptual yet they are hospitable to alien information 
(to some extent at least) and go some way toward satisfying the Generality constraint. 
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transitive relation. It is possible for A and B, and for B and C, to be coreferential de jure, even 
though A and C are not. But if the relation of  de jure coreference rested on the identity of the 
mental files respectively associated with each of the terms, it should be transitive, since 
identity is a transitive relation. Pinillos takes his argument to support Fine‘s ‗relationist‘ 
approach to de jure coreference (Fine 2007). 
 Pinillos gives examples like the following to show that de jure coreference is not a 
transitive relation : 
 
 (0) We were debating whether to investigate both Hesperus1 and Phosphorus2; but when 
we got evidence of their true identity, we immediately sent probes there 1,2 . 
(1) As a matter of fact, my neighbor John1 is Professor Smith2, you will get to meet (the 
real) John Smith1,2 tonight. 
(2) Hesperus1 is Phosphorus2 after all, so Hesperus-slash-Phosphorus1,2 must be a very 
rich planet. 
 
He argues that in each example, there are three terms A, B and C such that A and B are 
coreferential de jure, B and C also are coreferential de jure, yet A and C are only coreferential 
de facto. In (0) and (2), ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘ are coreferential de facto (as they 
feature in the informative identity judgment ‗Hesperus is Phosphorus‘), yet both ‗Hesperus‘ 
and ‗Phosphorus‘ are de jure coreferential with ‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘ in (2) or with the 
anaphoric ‗there‘ in (0). As Pinillos puts it, 
 
‘There’ and ‘Hesperus’ are de jure coreferential because… one who understands 
the use of (0) must know that if ‘there’ refers at all it must corefer with 
‘Hesperus’. Hearers who understand the use of (0) know that those occurrences 
can’t refer to different objects. Similarly, hearers who understand the use of (0) 
must also know that if ‘there’ refers at all, it must corefer with ‘Phosphorus’. 
Hearers must know that they can’t refer to different things. Hence, (…) ‘there’ is 
de jure coreferential with both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. (Pinillos 2009) 
 
The critierion for de jure coreference which Pinillos appeals to here is the knowledge 
criterion: when two terms are de jure coreferential, one cannot understand the utterance 
without knowing that the two terms corefer (if they refer at all). 
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So example (0) shows that de jure coreference is not a transitive relation.  Pinillos 
concludes that third objects account fail. According to such accounts, he says, 
 
Occurrences A and B in a discourse are de jure coreferential because they stand in a 
certain relation R to a single object X (e.g. a single mental file). 
 
This cannot be right, Pinillos points out, for if it were — if de jure coreference was a matter 
of identity (identity of mental file, say) — it would be a transitive relation ; but example (0) 
establishes that it is not. 
 
4.4. Reply to Pinillos 
 
I agree with Pinillos that example (0) shows that de jure coreference, as characterized through 
the knowledge criterion, is not a transitive relation ; but I deny that this argues against the 
mental-file account (or third-object accounts in general). It does argue against a strong version 
of such accounts, namely : 
 
Occurrences A and B in a discourse are de jure coreferential (i.e. pass the knowledge 
test) just in case they stand in a certain relation R to a single object X (e.g. a single 
mental file). 
 
But it does not argue against a weaker version of the theory, according to which being 
associated with a single mental file (or any relevant third object) is sufficient, though not 
necessary, for de jure coreference : 
 
Occurrences A and B in a discourse are de jure coreferential if they stand in a certain 
relation R to a single object X (e.g. a single mental file). 
 
This weaker version leaves open the possiblity that two occurrences A and B might be de jure 
coreferential (i.e. pass the knowledge test) for some other reason than their being associated 
with the same mental file. 
 The knowledge test characterizes de jure coreference in terms of a priori knowledge of 
coreference. Now, if two terms have the same sense, understanding the terms (knowing their 
sense) entails knowing that they corefer ; that follows from the constraint that sense 
determines reference. So identity of sense entails de jure coreference. But why should the 
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entailment be bidirectional ? There may be other sources of a priori knowledge of coreference 
than sense-sharing. Indeed, I will argue, that is exactly what is going on in Pinillos‘s 
examples : a priori knowledge of coreference is secured, but the source of such knowledge is 
not the identity of the associated mental files (or the identity of sense, more generally). 
In each example we find that two terms (say, ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘) are 
associated with distinct files — so they are only de facto coreferential — but there is also a 
third file (say the ‗Venus‘ file or, better, the ‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘ file) which is created 
when one learns that the two terms actually corefer. That third file is what the ‗merge‘ model 
posits : it says that, upon understanding and accepting an identity, one feeds all the 
information from the two initial files into a third file, and suppresses the initial files.
11
 One the 
weaker ‗link‘ model, one does not (automatically) suppress the initial files, but that does not 
prevent one from opening a file for the unique object which is the referent of the two initial 
files. It is the function of slash-terms such as ‗Hesperus/Phosophorus‘ to be associated with 
such files. On the ‗link‘ model, it is possible to construe such files as including each of the 
initial files (now connected though linking) as sub-files. Be that as it may, given the way the 
inclusive file is introduced and its role, it is a priori that it corefers with each of the initial 
files. So it is a priori that ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘ corefer (if they refer at all). 
Likewise it is a priori that ‗Phosphorus‘ and ‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘ corefer (if they refer at 
all). It follows that both ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘ are de jure coreferential with 
‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘. Yet these terms are not associated with the same file : ‗Hesperus‘ and 
‗Phosphorus‘ are associated respectively with what I called the ‗initial files‘, while 
‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘ is associated with what I called the ‗inclusive file‘.12 In this case, 
therefore, we have an instance of de jure coreference that is not accounted for in terms of a 
                                                 
11
 ‗On receipt of an identity-statement invoking two… clusters, the two appropriate cards are 
withdrawn and a new card is prepared, bearing both the names of which one heads one of the 
original cards and one the other, and incorporating the sum of the information contained in the 
original cards ; the single new card is returned to stock and the original cards are thrown 
away‘ (Strawson 1974 : 56). 
12
 As Fine notes, ‗it is not that the merged file represents the individual as the same as the 
earlier files, since that would require that the earlier files represent the individual as the same. 
Rather, the new file, if I choose to create it, will represent the individual as being the same as 
the earlier files‘ (Fine 2007 : 69). In this passage in which he talks about the mental-file 
account, Fine seems to acknowledge that ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Hesperus/Phosphorus‘ are not 
‗strictly coreferential‘ (even though they pass the ‗knowledge test‘ he himself uses — see 
footnote 5). Strict coreference, thus understood (i.e. narrowly), corresponds to the idea that 
the two terms are associated with a single file. (Fine argues against accounts of strict 
coreference in terms of either mental files or nondescriptive senses, but his arguments do not 
convince me, and, as far as I can tell, his criticism does not apply to the present account.) 
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shared file, but in terms of a relation other than identity between two distinct files : the 
relation — whatever it is exactly — that holds between the initial files and the inclusive file. 
Such cases can be accounted for within the mental-file account, so they do not argue against 
it ; they only argue against an implausibly strong version resting on the (unargued) premise 
that only the identity of associated files can be responsible for a priori knowlege of 
coreference.
13
 
 
                                                 
13
 This paper was my Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture (Oxford, 25 January 2011) ; I am 
happy to dedicate it to Kevin for his birthday. The research leading to the lecture has received 
funding from the European Community‘s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 
under grant agreement n° FP7-238128 and ERC grant agreement n° 229441–CCC. 
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